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Martial Law in Poland in the Context of International Legal Standards

195

It is appropriate to stress at this point that obligatio~s under the
international covenants on human nghts are to be fulfilled by the
states signatory to these covenants. They alon~ ~an raise the question
of the failure to abide by these or other provlSlons of the covenants
by a participating state. The order established by the covenants
should be observed in the process. Meanwhile, these standards of
international law are glaringly violated by Western countries, first of
all, the United States, which are not parties either to the covenants
on human rights, or to the overwhelming majority of other
multilateral conventions on rights of man.
The West-launched anti-Polish 'propaganda aggression,' as
General Jaruzelski called it, constitutes interference in Poland's
domestic affairs, and is an obvious violation of universally recognized
standards of international law, including those reaffirmed by the
Final Act. The discriminatory measures announced against Poland by
the US, and some of its allies, are against international law. This is
overt blackmail and pressure, an attem~t to shaken loose the
peaceful structure of state-to-state relations.
NOTES
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Final Act, Cmnd.
6198, London, 1975; Soviet text in Pravda and Izvestiya, 2 August 1975
Ibid.
These Covenants are reprinted in Ian .Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on
Human Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1981, pp. 118-45.
Ibid., pp_ 129-30.
This article is supplied by courtesy of Novosti Press Agency.
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EAST EUROPE'S REACTIONS TO THE POLISH DECEMBER

STEPHEN BOWERS

The imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 was a
depressing though instructive event. The apparent death of the
wideranging reform movement set in motion by the actions of the
Solidarity movement seemed, like the crushing of the 'Prague
Spring', to signify that the prospects for the peaceful pluralist
evolution of Communist Eastern Europe remained unpromising.
Official reactions to the 'Polish December' throughout the region
confirmed that grim prognosis. Relatively independent foreign
policies and limited, 'liberal' economic reforms might find friendly
receptions among some of the regional party leaderships from time
to time, but Solidarity's demands were perceived as pressing well
beyond the limits of accepted diversity.
An examination of Eastern Europe's official response to the
Polish crisis is worthwhile for several reasons. First, it reveals the
aominant party attitudes on non-party reform movements and how to
deal with them. The extent to which the various parties viewed
Solidarity as a threat to socialism is strong evidence that general
domestic reforms of this nature are not likely to gain official
acceptance in Eastern Europe in the near future. The largely
favourable evaluations of the regime's state of emergency indicates
that the Polish methods might be applied in other nations in the
unlikely event that they faced a similar crisis. Secondly, such an
examination is useful because it helps us gauge the degree of unity
within Eastern Europe on one issue. Obviously, there is not total or
absolute unanimity, but there is, ~s this study shows, at least a general
consensus. Thirdly a look at the response of individual countries
enables one to determine the impact of national considerations historical or contemporary - on policies relative to an important
regional issue. Finally, this examination provides a useful contrast
with the divided Western reactions to the Polish crisis. While the West
agonized over a proper response, Eastern Europe, as we will see,
formulated a relatively concerted one which included a diversity of
supportive statements as well as an important material relief effort.
PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT TO POLISI:I SOCIALISM

The primary focus of this study is on the reactions of the active
'Bloc' states - East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Romania. Their views on the nature of the threat to Polish
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statement on 15 December which noted the legitimate concern of
the . Romanians for the 'baleful evolution of the activity of
anti-socialist forces' in Poland. The result of this activity was great
'disorder in economic life', chaos in social and political affairs, and
serious danger. to Poland's 'progress, freedom, a.nd ~depen~ence'. In
a more detailed analysis on 26 December, Scznteza explamed th~t
Poland's problems stemmed from four factors: economIC
shortcomings, social failings, bad weather, and lastly, 'extremists'.
While not part of the 'Bloc', Yugoslavia's view: of t~ese events.is
interesting because it provides an ~dependent _whil~ s~ill con:mumst
perspectiv~. The Yugoslav leadership flatly rejected the:mot~on that
the Polish conflict was one in which the counterrevolutIOnarIes were
on one side and the revolutionaries on the other. Rather, they
depicted the situation as a stru~gle between t?e 'Polish. wo;king
class ... and the statist, bureaucratlc, and centralIst monopoly. The
Yugoslav leadership also suggeste.d that the Sovi~t Union .was
responsible for many of the negatIve developments In Poland SInce
1945 and faulted the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) for
rejecting Solidarity's call for a national plebicite on the country's
government. The plebicite, they insisted, was a 'chance for the party
to restore the trust of the working class. ,6
EVALUATIONS OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

The 'Bloc' consensus is somewhat less complete in terms of the
various estimates of the necessity and success of the Polish state of
emergency. Yet, they all agreed that some decisive action was
required and none J' oined in supporting the charges of the renegade
. re al·Ity a ,state 0 f
' 7
Yugoslavs that the martial law or der was In
war.
At the same time, all of the 'Bloc' members consistently refuted
suggestions by the Italian Communist Party that J aruzelski' s
government had seriously erred in imposing a state of emergency.
The norm therefore, was support for martial law, but the
enthusiasm wi;h which support was given varied. The greatest
restraint, once again, was exercised by the Stalinist R~manians who
agreed that martial law was necessary ~ecause the PolIsh people had
'run out of patience', but softened theIr support for. t?e ~easure by
suggesting that a 'strengthening of the active partl~IpatIOn o~ the
working class' would be required before a re~toratIOn of natlO~al
unity was possible. This assertion appeare~ In .sever~. ~omaman
publications and must be taken as at least an Implied cnt~cIsm of the
actions associated with the Polish state of emergency. It IS, however,
a very limited one and not nearly as fundamental as, for example, .the
Yugoslav insistence that the 'democratic path' was the appropnate
one for Poland.
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The Hungarian response was also fairly restrained in its
evaluations of martial law. The Hungarian leadership maintained that
martial law was necessary but cautioned that the 'road leading to
calm is still a long one.' The party daily observed that the state of
emergency had, however, 'created the prerequisities for a gradual
restoration of the economy for reforms, and ensuring public order
and strengthening the state.' Politburo member Sandor Gaspar, who
is also Secretary General of the Hungarian National Trade Union
Council, nevertheless indicated an official deviation from the
hardline posture of Hungary's neighbours. Speaking to a national
television audience, Gaspar identified what many in the Hungarian
leadership see as one of the main lessons of Poland when he
explained that the

s

... Socialist countries' trade union movement does not have an
appropriate jurisdiction....If it operates only according to
instructions ... , if its task is merely implementing a given policy, ... this
leads to social conflicts... This is borne out by the events in Poland. 9

The other Soviet partners in Eastern Europe emphasized not
only the necessity of December crackdown but also that J aruzelski's
actions had quickly brought the intended results. The Czechs, East
Germans, and Bulgarians stressed that martial law was greeted with
complete calm and understanding by the Poles. Bratislava Pravda
offered the picture of a Poland in which
... People are lining up in a disciplined way for bread, milk, meat, and
other foodstuffs. The supplies of basic foodstuffs are incomparably
better than prior to the imposition of the state of emergency on 13
December 1981. 10

A supporting element in this theme was the proposition that the
indignation of the Polish people was directed not against those who
imposed severe military rule but rather against the leadership of
Solidarity. Accordingly, the residents of Czechoslovakia, the GDR,
and Bulgaria learned that the 'great majority' of the Poles responded
with 'outrage' upon hearing of the misdeeds of Solidarity activists.
They were told that the 'masks are falling' as Solidarity's 'secret
documents' were uncovered and that even Solidarity members were
'shocked' at the discovery of what their 'bosses' had been preparing
for the nation. Because of such disclosures, East European readers
were informed, the Solidarity leaders had lost political support in
Poland 'rapidly' in the days after December.
Militant hardliner commentators devoted considerable time to
supporting the most severe actions taken to suppress dissident

>
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elements in Poland. The Czechs and East Germans were most effusive
in praising the efforts of the PUWP to 'cleanse itself' of those who
had presumably betrayed it in the final critical mont~s ~efore
December. Arrests of the 'ringleaders of counterrevolutIOn were
reported as an encouraging sign that the Polish situa~ion was
returning to normal. With the rising number of dete:ntIOns, the
Czechs and East Germans insisted with greater confIdence that
Poland's public life was 'easing' .. Yet, even in the ~a~e of such
optimistic accounts, words of cautIOn and a call for vI~ance .were
extended. The need for caution and vigilance was explamed m an
editorial in Bratislava Pravda on 16'January 1982 which insisted that
the 'enemies of socialist renewal... are not lowering their weapons.'
Passive resistance by stubborn Solidarity supporters ~d even
bombings were the evidence cited in support of this admomtIOn. The
Wujek mine incid~nt in mid-December 1981 a~d ~ther effo:rts by
Solidarity to maintain an 'atmosphere .of tenSI?n . s~rved, ~n the
Czech view, as justification for the warnmg t~at It IS ~mpos,sIble to
conduct a discussion with the inveterate enemIes of sOCIalIsm. These
East European observations parallel those of Leonid Zamyatin, head
of the International Information Department of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, who insisted on Moscow's 'Studio-9'
television show on 27 February 1982 that the Polish
counterrevolution had been 'stopped, but it has not been eradicated.'
ANSWERING THE WEST

Thus, in the view of most East European authorities, a new danger
emerged following the imposition of martial law: an intensified but
desperate Western campaign to save the Polish counterrevolution.
The Western powers, according to official media, responded with
bitterness and frustration upon seeing their subversive plans
thwarted. The leadership of Eastern Europe explained that the
Western response to martial law was not motivated by any real
concern for the Polish people but rather by a desire to return to the
'cold war'. The Czech diatribes were the most abusive and started
with the proposition that the Western powers had wanted a
'reactionary, anti-Soviet Poland' ever since the Yalta conference. The
American reaction to the latest frustration of that desire was
presented as nothing less than a 'frontal rectionary offesive' against
all progressive forces. In fact, what President Reagan wanted to gain
out of the Polish difficulties was held to be a restoration of the
'privileged position of power for American imperalism'. Reagan,
they charged, wanted to reverse the 'defeats and failures' of the era
of detente by returning to the policies of confrontation. On
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16 January 1982, Rude Pravo accused the United States and its
NATO allies of setting the stage for a dangerous confrontation by
moving troop exercise areas closer to the borders of the Warsaw Pact
nations. The East Germans supplemented these charges with their
denunciation of a 'virulent anti-Polish campaign' being mounted in
We~t Ge~any, while Bulga?a accused the United States of dietating
to ItS allIes and transformm!f Western Europe into a 'satellite of
American political thought'. 1 When the lack of Western unity
became apparent, East European official statements gleefully noted
increasing resistance to U S pressures for sanctions against the martial
law regime in Poland and against the Soviet Union. By February
1982, reports frequently commented on the 'isolation' of the United
States and the refusal of Western Europe to join a new 'cold war'.
With the introduction of specific proposals for sanctions against
the USSR and Poland, even the relatively moderate Romanians
joined the chorus of critics of the West. Prior to this
time, the Romanians had limited themselves to a general call for
non-interference, presumably applicable to East and West alike.
Nevertheless, their criticisms were restrained and much less sweeping
that those of their neighbours. For example, Scinteia ignored
suggestions about the American appetite for confrontation and
simply commented that sanctions 'do not help' the process of
normalization but simply raise 'fresh obstacles' to a resolution of the
crisis. The most pointed criticism by the Romanians was the
accusation that the United States was guilty of hypocrisy for
supporting Latin American regimes like Chile while professing moral
outrage at the establishment of a military dictatorship in Poland.
THE EAST EUROPEAN RELIEF MISSION FOR POLAND

Contributions to the international debate over the Polish problem,
however satisfying they might have been to the political position of
the J aruzelski government, by themselves did little to relieve Polish
suffering. Recognizing this, Poland's neighbours joined in a relief
mission for their embattled ally. This effort is especially noteworthy
because it came at a time when the Western nations found themselves
seriously divided over specific steps to be taken in response to the
Polish crisis.
The East German effort was the best organized and most
productive contribution to this campaign. With very thorough media
orchestration, the East German programme made precise ideological
and political points while also alleviating Polish hardships. A special
account for the Polish relief fund was set up at the East Berlin
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savings bank and potential contributors were reminded that
'donations confirm an int.ernationalist affinity.'12 Czechosl.ovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania made similar if less elaborate
contributions of food and clothing to the support of the Polish
population.
The East European relief programme went beyond simple
charity as could be seen from the series of trade protocols signed in
January and.February 1982. On this matter, unanimity has appeared
to be the rule as Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary all
signed similar trade agreements with Poland in a three week period.
During the same time, the GDR was negotiating for such an
agreement and even the non-'Bloc' League of Communists of
Yugoslavia held discussions with the PUWP on ways of improving
cooperation between the two organizations on a broad range of
issues. During the week of 25 January 1982, the CMEA Commission
for Cooperation in Planning held a series of talks between
representatives of the ten member states for the purpose of
developing a multilateral assistance programme to help Poland
overcome its economic difficulties. The Commission's closing
statement emphasized that such a programme was vital because of
the policies being pursued by the United States and some of the
NATO governments vis-a-vis Eastern Europe.
THE MEANING OF EASTERN EUROPE'S REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS

On balance, Eastern Europe's reactions to the Polish crisis have been
fully supportive of the positions taken by the J aruzelski government.
The consensus which emerged in the period after the crackdown on
Solidarity was a consistent if uneven one. The most obvious conclusion
from an examination of official responses during this time is that
Czechoslovakia and East Germany exhibited the most intensely
dogmatic attitudes within the region. Different circumstances
compelled both regimes to adopt policies characterized by an
extreme hostility toward the Polish reformers and their Western
sympathizers. Some observers have suggested that the traditional
Prussian view of the Poles as 'rabble' is one factor explaining the
GDR's policy. The insecurity from which East Germany has suffered
as a consequence of its 'front-line, divided nation' status is certainly
another. The prospect of geographical isolation as a result of a Polish.
'heresy', however remote it might be, must have been distressing to
East Berlin. The GDR's unannounced state of emergency in January
1982 was a graphic illustration of the depth of the nation's concern.
The Czech reaction can be explained by at least two
,considerations. The first is official concern about a Polish 'contagion'
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that might have rekindled some of the spirit of 1968. Ironically it is
those who did not remember the 'Prague Spring appear'to have been
most sympathetic towards the Poles. Older Czechs knew of the
brutal lessons of the Czech normalization and may have felt, if
anything, a certain satisfaction that the Poles apparently did not
succeed where they had failed. A second factor is Czech resentment
of Polish participation in the 1968 jnvasion .and the Polish occupation
of Northern Moravia in 1938-39. Therefore, most Czechs have little
reason to sympathize with Polish reformers, and the hardline
position serves the needs of the Czech 'normalizers' in power and at
the same time is compatible with much popular sentiment.
Bulgaria's traditional pro-Russian attitudes and the leadership's
consistently doctrinaire inclinations support its inclusion among the
most enthuasiastic supporters of martial law. However, its distance
from Poland and the absence of any strong liberal-reformist periods
of rule reduce the intensity and attention that the authorities
devoted to rhetoric about the Polish crisis. Hungary also remained
among the hardliners on the Polish events although its support was
sometimes inconsistent. The Hungarian departures from orthodoxy
were most apparent in discussions of the role of the trade unions in
socialist states. The bitter experiences of 1956 and the country's
successful but painful rebuilding of labour relationships must have
inspired a genuine concern for the prospects of a reform movement
that did not seem to recognize its limitations.
Of the member states of the 'Bloc', only Romania demonstrated
any consistent inclination toward moderation in its assessments of
Polish events. Romania's frank and balanced assessment of Polish
problems - and the placing of 'extremists' no more than fourth in
order of importance - indicates at least some willingness to defy the
dominant line. However, at best, the Romanian stance demonstrated
only a limited independence; on the most fundamental questions, the
Romanians generally supported the positions of their allies.
Thus, the conclusion that must be drawn from an examination
of East European responses to the Polish crisis is that orthodoxy
prevails throughout the Warsw Pact region. Pluralism is an operative
factor but its impact does not extend to a defiance of what is
supposed to be the proper relationship between the ruling party
and other political institutlons. Social, cultural, and econorrlli:
diversity is present but does not point in the direction of major
independerident reform movements.
The consistently critical
perceptions of Solidarity's impact on Polish socialism reveals a clear
understanding by the party leaderships of the need for the
authorities to retain control of any significant social or political

La;
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endeavours. Their evaluations of the necessity for and progre~s of the
state of emergency shows a general agreement on the reqUIred an?
acceptable methods of retaining or re?aining ~ontrol over domestIc
developments. In addition, the exceptIOnal umty o~ t?e resp~nse.to
Western proposals for sanctions demonstrates the lImIts of. qwersity
in international affairs when the party's methods of domestIc control
are at issue.
Finally the concerted relief programme serves to further the
conception ~hat the Warsaw Treaty Organiz~tion states co.n~tit~te a
cohesive community bound by 'an inten:atlOnal cl~ss. aff~mty and
exhibiting an active concern for the trIals and dIffIcultIes of all
member-states.
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MYTH AND REALITY IN RECENT SOVIET FICTION

MAR Y SETON- WATSON
Soviet 'official' fiction of the last ten to fifteen years is of interest
for several reasons unrelated to its literary value. For Sovjet citizens, it
is a very useful barometer by which to measure the internal political
climate and on which to base conjectures about likely trends for the
immediate future. And for foreigners interested in the Soviet Union,
it Car): provide startling insights into the mental outlook as well as the
physical circumstances of ordinary Soviet citizens. The 'official'
fiction is however largely ignored by Western students of the USSR.
Partly this is because so many good books by Russian emigre writers
have appeared in English in recent years (particularly the satirical
works of Voinovich and Zinoviev) that these uncensored authors are
felt to have a monopoly of the truth about their native land. Partly it
is because many Soviet novels and stories are long-winded, with
stereotyped characters and predictable plots: English publishers are
not interested in having them translated, and few English students of
Russian are prepared to devote time to reading them. Yet even the
dullest of these recent novels often contai.ns scenes apparently taken
straigh~ from Soviet daily life. Some of the scenes d-escribe life as it
really is, with accuracy and in detail; in other books the real-life
scenes are prettified, and show life as the authors would like it to be.
Both the reality and the myth convey much about the quality of
Soviet existence.
(i)
An ex<).mple of stark reality is a recent story by Yuri Nagibin about
that comparatively new Soviet phenomenon, the hit-and-run private
car-driver. Two professional couples, a Leningrad architect and a
Moscow scientist with their wives, are driving back to Moscow from
holiday along a main road. Suddenly an old man on a moped shoots
out of a side-road in front of them:

'Olga, sitting in the back seat of the car, saw the old man knocked
down as though it was happening on the television screen, not in real
life ... Somehow she got out of the car, and was sick by the
roadside... The first voice she heard was her own, hysterically
demanding that they take the old man to a hospital. Someone trod
painfully on her foot, but she went on shouting about the hospital,
until Igor seized her by the elbow and dragged her back to the car.
She resisted him, continUing to shout, while he hissed "Shut up, you
fooll", his eyes white w;ith fury. Sudd~ly she gave up and l!lIowed
herself to be bundled back into the hateful car, where she burst into

